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IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF UTAH
ATKIN, WRIGHT & MILES,
)
Chartered, a Utah corporation,)

)
Plaintiff - Respondent,

)
)
vs.
)
)
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE )
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, et.al.,)
)
Defendant - Appellant.
)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Case No. 18232

NATURE OF CASE
Atkin,

Wright

& Miles,

Chartered,

brought

this

action

against The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company to
(1) obtain an injunction prohibiting Mountain Bell from changing
the telephone number used by Atkin, Wright & Miles, and (2) for
damages which resulted after the number was changed,
the

placement

of

mechanical

and

"live"

intercepts

including
on

the

number designated for the law firm in Mountain Bell's Tela Lease
Agreement and in the 1980 Southern Utah Telephone Directory.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
The lower court denied Mountain Bell's motion to dismiss
the Complaint, or to limit liability, and proceeded with a jury
trial.

The jury found in favor of Plaintiff and against Defen-

dant and returned a verdict against Mountain Bell in the sum of
$25,000 compensatory damages, and $30,000 punitive damages.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Mt. Bell seeks to reverse the judgment of the trial court.
Atkin, Wright & Miles seeks to affirm the jury verdict.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Atkin, Wright
George,

Utah.

Miles is a

&

Prior

to

the

small law firm located in St.

formation

of

the

law

firm,

J.

MacArthur Wright was using the telephone numbers of 673-4606 and
When he and Mr. J. Ralph Atkin formed the new

673-4607 (T.381).

firm of Atkin & Wright, they desir~d to retain the use of those
numbers and negotiated with Dennis Wood, St.
Mt. Bell specifically for those numbers,
Bell

agreed and did

assign

to

them

George Manager of

Dennis Wood,

673-4605,

4606,

for Mt.
4607 and

4608.

This was the only way to preserve those two numbers and

still

have

a

4-line

rotary

capability

negotiations

were

reduced

to

(T. 5 4 6 ,

6) .

In

instrument,

Exh.

designated

as

that

"Atkin

&

writing

Wright,

(T.382,

563).

in

the

the

lessee/customer is

Attys. ",

"Tela

Those

with

the

Lease,"

telephone

number of 673-4605 designated as part of the lease.
(Exh. 1) was

When the telephone directory for October 1980,
published,

all

listings

in

the

attorneys were listed correctly.
(Exh.

white

pages

for

St.

George

Likewise, in the yellow pages

1, p.206), the telephone number of Atkin, Wright & Miles

was correctly listed as 673-4605, but through a mistake on the
part of Mt. Bell, this same number was listed for the law firm
of Allen, Thompson
Hughes,

followed

Thompson & Hughes,

&

Hughes across from the name of Michael D.
by

the

673-4892

correct
(T.47-76).

number

for

Allen,

The Allen law firm was

local counsel for Mt. Bell in the St. George area (T.67).
After

the

telephone

books

were

delivered

to

the

local

customers, Mr. Hughes, on behalf of the Allen firm, protested to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,2may contain errors.

Mt.

Bell.

The two law firms attempted to resolve this matter

through consultation and correspondence (T.186, Exh. 7).
With the threat of a lawsuit from the Allen firm alleging
damages of some
for

Mt.

Miles

Bell,

and

$300, 000,

became

other

199-200).

Mr.

Kenneth Madsen,

involved.

solutions

However, Mr.

general counsel

He met with Atkin,

were

P.roposed

by

them

Wright

&

(T.193-194;

Madsen acted as the "Solomon"

(T.176),

arbitrarily making the decision to change the telephone number
assigned to Atkin, Wright & Miles from 673-4605 to 628-2612 and
to

place

673-4605

on

a

mechanical

intercept

intercept installed on October 22, 1980
minutes of advance notice

(T.208).

(T.566).

The

(R.5, T.270), with only

However,

Mt.

Bell did not

first seek the approval of the Public Service Commission (T.582583) .
Even

though

Atkin,

Wright

Miles

&

had

contracted

with

Mt. Bell to use four individual lines, the mechanical intercept
was placed only on 673-4605 and not the remaining three numbers
(T.572).

If

someone

called

673-4605

while

the

mechanical

intercept was playing, the system did not rotate up to the next
three lines.

The caller would receive a busy signal and would

have to call back, or simply not call at all
caller dialed

673-4606,

4607 or

numbers had been disconnected.
the

incoming

telephone

lines

4608,
(T. 5 7 4,

to Atkin,

(T.574).

If the

he was told that these
Exh.

13

&

14) .

Thus,

Wright and Miles were

reduced by Mt. Bell's intercept from four operating lines to one
intercepted
intercept,

line
Atkin,

(T.574-576).
Wright

&

Miles

By

reason

claim a

of

that

breach of

initial
the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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3

Tela

Lease contract and for damages resulting from that breach.
Atkin,
restraining

& Miles

Wright
order

(R. 1, 2, 4, 5) .

The

hurriedly

directing Mt.

Bell

to

obtained

a

temporary

remove

the

intercept

temporary restraining order was

Mt. Bell immediately

served upon

(T.567-568), but it was not removed until

some 36 hours thereafter (T.272), even though it could have been
removed within one-half hour (T.567).
Every call
the

to Atkin,

intercept message

Atkin,

Wright

represented Mt.

Wright

gave

& Miles,
Bell

on

the

or
a

&

Miles was

caller

the

local

the

option

of

law

firm,

competing
level.

intercepted and

Thus,

calling
which

every call to

Respondent was adversely affected but only calls for Mr. Hughes
(one per day, Exh.
more,

7) were affected by the intercept.

the number assigned to Atkin,

Wright

&

Miles,

Further628-2612,

was a number with a new prefix (the prefix "673-" having been a
long established prefix in St.

George),

giving the appearance

that Atkin, Wright & Miles was a new law firm.
Mt. Bell moved to dissolve the temporary restraining order
and to deny the request for a preliminary injunction.
Court

indicated at the

hearing that

When the

it would take the matter

under advisement, Appellant moved to have its own motions denied
(R 68-69).

Accordingly, both motions were denied (R.47-48).

Since there was some indication that the telephone service
would be interrupted, Atkin, Wright & Miles directed their secretaries to maintain records concerning incoming calls prior to
the time the intercept was placed on its line and to keep track
of incoming calls after the intercept (T.332; Exh. 19-20).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Those records indicate that on Oct.
the intercept),
Oct. 23rd,

55 calls were received

(two days before

(T.335).

Until noon of

(the day after the intercept and before removal), two

calls were received
(T.336).

20th,

(no records were kept for the afternoon.)

After the intercept was removed 57 calls were received

on the first full day following removal (T.336, Exh. 21).
Until the mechanical

intercept was removed some

36 hours

after being installed, all incoming callers were given the new
number of Atkin, Wright & Miles of 628-2612.
was

removed

pursuant

placed on 628-2612,

to

court

order,

When the intercept
no

intercept

was

and thus a caller who had been given that

number during the 36 hour period received the following recorded
message:

"628-2612

has

been

disconnected"

(T.577).

Thus,

a

client or potential client may have thought that the law firm of
Atkin, Wright & Miles was no longer in business, or perhaps, had
lost its telephone service for non-payment.
After

the

trial

court granted Appellant's

own motion

deny its request to vacate the preliminary injunction

to

(R.47-48,

76-78), Mt. Bell petitioned this court for an extraordinary writ
or for interlocutory appeal

(R.52-66).

That request was denied

by this court (R.171).
Thereafter, the Allen firm filed a petition with the Public
Service Commission (PSC) requesting that the telephone number of
673-4605

be

placed

on

intercept

(Exh.

24,

T.243,

702-703).

Appellant actively supported and encouraged the petition.
Over

the

objection

directed that a

"live"

of

Atkin,

Wright

& Miles,

intercept be placed on

the

673-4605.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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PSC
The

installation of a live intercept occurred on Feb. 27, 1981 (Exh.
After that time,

17, T.459).

anyone dialing 673-4605,

should

have received a live operator to challenge the caller regarding
the

party

or

law

firm

However,

sought.

it

did

not

work

properly, as shown hereinafter.
refus~d

After the Supreme Court
injunction issued in October,

to vacate the preliminary

1980, Mt.

Bell published a news

article in the Nov. 18, 1980 edition of the Spectrum (Exh. 16).
That article stated in part as follows:
Clients should dial the firm of Allen, Thompson & Hughes at
673-4892 and the firm of Atkin, Wright & Miles at 673-4605.
However,

when

the

PSC

became effective on Feb.
public announcements,
ings,

that

Atkin,

ordered

the

live

intercept

(which

27, 1981), Mt. Bell failed to make any

including "stuffers" in its monthly bill-

Wright

Miles'

&

telephone

number

haq been

changed to 628-2612 (T.225-226).
The intercept operators were located in Denver, Colorado and
were

apparently

given

instructions

answer intercepted calls.
ing

to

numbers
occurred

locate
for

an

both

through

the

Mt.

Bell

as

to

how to

If the caller was simply try-

attorney
firms

by

for

were

use

of

the

first

sometimes
live

time,

given.

operators.

the

telephone

Many

problems

Some

of

these

abuses were recorded by Atkin, Wright & Miles and played to the
jury at the time of trial (Exh. 13).
The first portion of Exhibit 13 concerns problems created by
the first intercept,

i.e.

busy signals or that "673-4606,

and 4608 have been disconnected."
Exhibit

13

deals

with

the

4607

The remaining taped portion of

inadequate

service

of

the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1ive

intercept.

The tape can be summarized as follows:

FIRST CALLS MADE
(February 27, 1981, the day the live
intercept was installed).
First Dial: Dialed 673-4605 (old number); telephone rang 3
times with no answer and "cut off".
Second Dial: Dialed 673-4605, live operator responded and
said "What party are you calling?" When the
caller indicated he just wanted an attorney,
he was cut off.
Third Dial: Dialed 673-4605, number of Mr. Atkin given,
caller asked to repeat telephone number, but
was cut off prior to receiving same.
Fourth Dial: Dialed 673-4605, operator answered and said
"One moment please", wait of approximately
1 minute with no answer from operator thereafter. No information provided by operator.
Fifth Dial: Dialed 673-4605, 3 rings, Mr. Hughes phone
number given correctly.
Sixth Dial: Dialed 673-4605, no response and "cut off".
Seventh Dial: Dialed 673-4606, received satisfactory
response.
SECOND CALLS (Exact date not indicated on tape.)
First Dial:
Dialed 673-4605, operator asked "Who are you
calling?", caller was cut oft.
Second Dial: Dialed 673-4605, operator asked "Which
attorney do you want?", caller cut off.
Third Dial:
Dialed 673-4605, caller cut off.
Fourth Dial: Dialed 673-4605, operator answered, caller
cut off before receiving correct phone no.
THIRD CALLS (March 2, 1981)
First Dial:
Dialed 673-4605, no ring, no response.
Second Dial: Dialed 673-4605, no ring, no response.
Third Dial:
Dialed 673-4605, no ring, no response.
Fourth Dial: Dialed 673-4606, no ring, no response.
Fifth Dial:
Dialed 673-4605, received busy signal.
Sixth Dial:
Dialed 673-4605, received busy signal.
Seventh Dial: Dialed 673-4605, no ring, no response.
Eighth Dial: Dialed 673-4605, no ring, no response.
FOURTH CALLS (Exact date not indicated on tape.)
First Dial:
Dialed 673-4605, cut off before dialing
digit number "5".
Second Dial: Dialed 673-4605, cut off before dialing
digit number "5".
Third Dial:
Dialed 673-4605, operator asked, "What number
are you calling?"; caller said "673-4605";
operator asked, "What attorney do you want?";
caller answered, "I am looking for my
attorney."; operator responded, "Are you
going to give me his name or not?" Correct
phone number finally given to caller.
Fourth Dial: Dialed 673-4605, received operator, but cut
off before receiving any number.
FIFTH CALLS (June 26, 1981)
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Ii

Dialed 673-4605, received taped message that
"673-4605 is not in service."
Second Dial: Dialed 673-4606, received taped message that
"673-4606 is not in service."
SIXTH CALLS (July 6 I 1981)
Dialed 673-4605, after some confusion,
First Dial:
received correct phone number.
At the time of trial, Atkin, Wright & Miles called as

First Dial:

witnesses

clients,

testified
calling

public officials,

concerning

the

law

firm,

the

and fellow attorneys, who

difficul~ies

with

both

types

they
of

encountered
intercepts.

when
That

testimony indicated the following:
1. The County Clerk, Marjorie Howell, called
673-4605 numerous times atter the second intercept and was
advised that the number had been disconnected or was not in
service (T.116-117). Even after she finally got through,
the telephone rang with no answer when dialing 673-4605
(T.119).
2. Mr. Wadsworth testified he called at least a
dozen times, every halt hour and was never able to get
through on that particular day. At the time he was
restricted to bed (T.122).
3. Mr. Morrison testified that on April 4, 1981,
(after the second intercept) he called 673-4605 after
getting the number from the telephone book. When
calling, the telephone rang and rang with no answer,
so he called the operator and, " She was tart with me,
belligerent, and says she didn't know anything about any
number change.
I had to get in my automobile twice that day
and drive to the office because I couldn't get the number."
(T.278).
He also indicated he had trouble for several days in a
row and that it upset him and his wife (T.280).
4. Mr. Richard C. Hunter, a gentlemen confined to
a wheelchair and dependent on the telephone, testified
that sometime near March 3, 1981, he tried to call on
numerous occasions and received no answer or intercept
(T.290). He also indicated he sent his secretary to
get the number, thereafter lost it and called information
and received no " referring number" .
(T . 2 9 1 ) .
5. Reah Canfield testified that she had difficulty
getting ahold of John L. Miles and had she not prepaid
for having her wills prepared, she would have had someone
else do the work (T.297-299).
6. Alan Boyack, an attorney in St. George, testified
he tried to call Atkin, Wright & Miles for some time and was
unable to get through, so he got in his car and traveled to
the law office to find out what was wrong with the telephone
system (T. 87).
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Evidence was also presented concerning damages on the part
of Atkin,

Wright

Miles,

&

including computations

indicating a

reduction in gross revenue (T.519-537, Exh. 27) after the
intercepts
that

all

673-4605

were
of

installed.

the

required

office

Additionally,
supplies

replacement,

and

with
thus,

testimony
the

indicated

telephone

special

number

damages were

I

established

in

the

approximate

sum

of

$400.00

(T.507,

508,

514-51 7, Exh s. 2 8 , 2 9, 3 0, 31 , 3 2) .
At a hearing held March 20, 1981, when Mr. Madsen, attorney
for the Appellant was reminded, again, of the malfunctions of the
live intercept, after first denying any problems existed and he
was then asked if he didn't think the telephone company had a
duty to make a good faith effort to see that the intercept was
working properly,
second

time,

he

he

resonded,

repeated

"Nope!".
the

Upon being asked the

one-word

response,

"Nope"

(T.410-412).
The jury returned a verdict in the sum of $25, 000 as cornpensatory damages and $30,000 as punitive damages.
judgment that Atkin,

Wright

It is this

Miles seeks to have affirmed by

&

this Court, plus an award of attorney fees.
I. ESTABLISHED RULES OF APPELLATE REVIEW, BUTTRESSED BY THE
PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE JURY, REQUIRE THE AFFIRMANCE
OF THE JURY'S VERDICT.
TARIFFS MUST BE CONSTRUED AGAINST
APPELLANT.
On appeal from a judgment for Plaintiff, the Supreme Court
is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the Plaintiff

(Powers v.

Taylor 14 Utah 2d 152,

1963; Oberhansly v. Earle, Utah, 572 P.2d 1384).

379 P. 2d 380,
If the record

contains substantial evidence to support the verdict, the Supreme
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Court will not disturb the judgment (First Security Bank of Utah
v.

J.B.J.

Feedyards,

Inc.

Case No.

17270 filed July 20, 1982).

When the Supreme Court finds there is doubt as to whether reasonable minds might arrive at different conclusions, then the matter
presents a question of fact that should be determined by a jury
(Winsness v. M.J. Conoco Distributors, Inc. Utah, 1979, 593 P.2d
1303).
In Powers, supra, this Court noted:
it is the jury's prerogative as the trier of the
facts to assess the damages, and that because of its
advantaged position in close proximity to the trial, the
parties and the witnesses, its findings thereon will not be
disturbed so long as there is any reasonable basis in the
evidence to support them.
In this same case, the court noted that the action of the
trial court in modifying or confirming the

jury verdict adds

some verity to the judgment, citing Geary v. Cain 69 Utah 340,
255 P.

418.

Here,

the unanimous

jury verdict was allowed to

stand unmodified by the trial judge, who commended the jury for
being attentive and conscientious.

(T. 784).

The collective judgment of an eight member jury should.not
be easily altered.

In Snyderville Transportation Co.,

Inc. v.

Christiansen 609 P.2d 939 (Utah, 1980) this Court said:
We first note that the decisions reached by a jury, acting
as sole finder of fact, are to be accorded due deference by
a reviewing court.
Such deference must necessarily extend
to a jury's conclusion regarding the damages suffered by
the plaintiff.
In
evidence

order

to

reverse,

"such that

all

the

Supreme

Court

reasonable minds must

must

find

the

necessarily so

conclude" that Respondent failed to prove its cause of action by
a preponderance of the evidence

(Howarth v. Ostergaard 30 Utah
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2d 183, 515 P.2d 442, 1973).
Tariffs upon which Appellant relies, if applicable, are to
be construed against Mt. Bell. Josephson v. Mountain Bell (Utah,
1978) 576 P.2d 850 states:
Defendant phone company bases its defense in part upon
tariffs filed with the Public Service Commission
With respect to those tariffs, these observations are
pertinent.
They are filed by'the utilities themselves and
thus mainly serve their own interests.
They should be
construed strictly against the utility; and the utility
should be required to strictly comply with them; and they
must be fair, reasonable and lawful.
The evidence produced at trial was substantial, persuasive
and clearly supportive of the

jury's verdict.

Viewed in the

light required on appeal, it dictates that the jury verdict be
affirmed.
II.
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER MT. BELL'S YELLOW PAGE BUSINESS AND THE TARIFF
LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY DO NOT APPLY.
Mr.

Madsen

Commission has
business

(T

correctly
no

72-74).

testified

that

jurisdiction over Mt.

the
Bell's

Public

Service

"Yellow Page"

It is well established that a

regulatory

body which is created by and derives its powers and duties from
statutes has no inherent regulatory powers, but only those which
are expressly granted.

"The rule is fundamental that restraints

or duties imposed by law must be clear and unequivocal."

Basin

Flying Service v. Public Service Commission 531 P.2d 1303, 1305
(Utah, 1975).
The

general grant of

jurisdiction to

Commission is Section 54-4-1,

U.C.A.,

the

Public

Service

giving regulatory power
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over every public utility.
in

Section

54-2-1 (30)

"telephone

The term "public utility" is defined

to

corporation"

include
is

a

defined

telephone
in

corporation.

A

54-2-1 (22)

to

Section

include every entity "owning, controlling, operating or managing
any

telephone

line

for

public

service".

The

term

"telephone

line" is defined in Section 54-2-1(21) to include all fixtures,
equipment,

etc.

necessary to facilitate communication by tele-

phone.
The

selling

nonutility

of

function.

advertising
The

in

the

legislature

"Yellow

Pages"

recognized

that

is

a

public

utilities might engage in other business and provided in Section
54-2-1(30) that:
Any corporation or person not engaged in business exclusively as a public utility as hereinbefore defined shall be
governed by the provisions of this title in respect only to
the public utility or' public utilities owned, controlled,
operated or managed by it or by him, and not in respect to
any other business or pursuit.
In Classified Directory Subscribers Association v.

Public

Service Commission of the District of Columbia 383 F.2d 510 (D.C.
Cir. 1967), the Court affirmed the order of the Commission finding that it did not have jurisdiction over advertising published
in the "Yellow Pages" because that function was not essential to
telephone service.

The Court of Appeals noted that "in only one

State, California, has a regulatory commission or a state court
found

that the

rates of classified advertising are

comprehensive

regulation."

that

Pages"

"Yellow

are

For
not

example,

subject

to

other

subject to

courts

Commission

holding

regulation

include Pilot Industries v. Southern Bell Telephone And Telegraph
Company

495

F.

Supp.

356

(S.C.

1979);

State ex

rel.

Mountain

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12

States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. District Court 160 Mont. 443,
503 P.2d 526

(1972);

Telegraph Company

and McTighe v.

216 F.2d 26

New England Telephone And

(2nd Cir.

1954)

where the Court

stated:
The publication of the classified directory, however, is
wholly a matter of private contract and contracts relating
thereto are not required to be filed with the Public Service
Commission which has no jurisdiction except over matters
relating to the public utility services rendered by the
company and the rates relative thereto.
Appellant, on pages 34-36 of its Brief, attempts to mislead
this Court into believing that the tariffs therein cited apply to
this case and limit the Appellant's liability.
insofar

as

this

case

listing

of

Respondent's

Hughes,

a

member

of

is

concerned,
number

the

firm

was made

after
Allen,

pellants quote a portion of Allen v.

the

The only error,
in the bold type

name

Thompson

of
&

Michael

Hughes.

D.
Ap-

General Telephone Co.

20

Wash. App. 144, 578 P.2d 1333 (1978) to support their assertion,
but that case actually supports Respondent's contention that the
error

in

this

case

is

beyond

the

jurisdiction of

Service Commission so tha.t the tariffs do not apply.

the

Public

In Allen,

the court reviewed the cases from other jurisdictions, categorized

them,

and

then

formulated

a

hybrid

ruling.

Instead

of

saying that only the white pages are governed by the tariffs or
that the

"Yellow Pages"

are a matter of private contract,

the

Washington court held that:
Thus, we hold that under Washington law, the initial
yellow-page listing in standard-size print is an essential
part of the telephone company's directory service in aid of
its primary business of transmitting messages and is subject
to public regulation. To this extent we disagree with those
courts which hold that all yellow-page services are a matter
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of private contract.
This ruling is virtually identical to the statement in 74

Arn. Jur. 2d Telecommunications, Section 32, page 333 that:
In the typical classified telephone directory, or the
"yellow pages" section of a directory there are four basic
types of listings:
( 1) alphabetical lightfaced-type listings (for which there is usually no charge) ; ( 2) alphabetical boldfaced-type listings; ( 3) alphabetical in-column
business card listings; and (4)'display advertising. It has
been held that while the sta.te public service commission has
jurisdiction to regulate type (1) matters, it does not have
jurisdiction over types (2), (3), and (4).
The error

in

this

case was

a

type

which an advertising charge is made

(T.

( 4)
72)

listing error for
so that even under

Appellent's own case, there would be no PSC jurisdiction, making
the tariff limitations inapplicable.

The reasons given in the

cases for this distinction is that the PSC has power to regulate
the

furnishing

of

services,

but

advertising,

apart

from

the

lightfaced free listing, is not a "service" rendered by a utility.

Other non-utility businesses may, and sometimes do, publish

competitive directories.
This

case

involving

the

Directory.

can

be

Capitol

Suppose

accurately
Legal

the

analogized

Directory

number

of

or

to

the

Parsons,

a

Utah
Behle

situation
State

Bar

& Latimer

532-1234 (T. 68), was listed after the name of Michael D. Hughes.
Even if Mr. Hughes protested as vigorously as he did in this case
(one Mt.
shot

Bell employee said he was so angry that he would have

them if

he'd had

a

gun!,

~.

691) ,

Reporters or the Utah State Bar do?
intercept

532-1234

and

give

Parsons,

number, what would Mt. Bell do?

what would the Capitol

If they asked Mt.
Behle

Bell to

& Latimer

a

new

If Mr. Hughes complained to the
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Public Service Commission, what would they do?
The proper answer is quite apparent and well illustrated by
Medic-Call, Inc. v. Public Service Commission 24 Utah 2d 273, 470
p. 2d

25 8

( 19 7 0) •

answering

The Defendant asserted

service utilizing

("beepers")

subscribed

to

jurisdiction over an

small portable telephone
by

physicians.

In

receivers

reversing

the

Commission's finding of jurisdiction, this Court said:
If defendants can regulate the service rendered by the
plaintiffs herein, could they not with equal propriety
regulate the semaphore signaling of the boy scouts or the
smoke signals of the Indians on a hunting expedition?
The Plaintiffs are not performing service as a public
utility, and the defendants have no authority to regulate
them. The order made by the Commission is set aside.
The

PSC

obviously

has

no

jurisdiction

over

the

Capitol

Reporters or the Utah State Bar and would leave Mr. Hughes to his
contractual remedy, if any, just as Mt. Bell should have done in
this

case.

Instead,

they

injected

themselves

into

a

dispute

between subscribers, albeit caused by their own negligence, and
willfully deprived Respondent
notice.
their

of

its

telephone

number without

Such intervention by the Appellant at the request of

St.

George

attorneys was

tariff §20(E) (4),

(R.

72)

a

clear violation

of

its

own

The owner of an independent telephone

company testified that he would have tried to reach an agreement
between the customers affected by such an error, but that if no
agreement

could be

reached,

he would do nothing,

letting

the

status quo remain and rely upon . the contractual limitations of
liability
Allen,

(T.

325).

Thompson

&

Had Mt.

Bell done this,

Hughes would have been

its liability to

limited by

cases Appellant now cites on page 36 of its brief.

the very
To illus-
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trate, in the McTighe case, supra, the telephone company omitted
the subscriber in its white pages and yellow pages.

The court

held that the liability for the white page omission was limited
by a

similar tariff,

while

the

liability

for

the yellow page

omission was limited by a provision in the advertising contract
limiting liability for errors.

The Appellant therefore had no

exposure to Allen, Thompson & Hughes for their negligent act, yet
they

intentionally

and willfully

damaged

Respondent

by

taking

away its telephone numbers, thereby breaching the contract with
the Atkin firm and subjecting Appellant to tort liability.
Not only did Appellant lack a limitation of liability as to
Respondent firm, whose "yellow page" listings were correct, but
the evidence demonstrated bad faith
notice,

[T.

Allen firm,

2 0 8] ;

making

a

(changing the number without

preference

for

its

attorneys,

the

[T. 67]; and failure to make a good faith effort to

ascertain that the intercepts worked properly,

[T.

410-12]) and

willful conduct that Appellant knew in advance would cause great
damage to Respondent's firm (Exh. 7).
III. JURY INSTRUCTIONS WERE PROPER AND WITHOUT ERROR.
A.
the

Appellant complains that "The Court erred in instructing

jury as

number."

to

the

existence of a

contract

for

the

telephone

Instruction 5-E reads:

When a telephone number is assigned to a subscriber and it
is accepted by the subscriber, a contract is created by
the telephone company and t~e subscriber. (R. 318)
In

fact,

Appellant's

own

tariff,

entitled

PRIVATE

LINE

TARIFF SERVICE, 2nd Revised Page 34.1 provides:
The term "Contract" denotes the service agreement between
a customer and the Telephone Company under which facilities
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for communication between specified locations for designated periods, and for the use of the customer and the
authorized users or joint users specifically named in the
contract are furnished in accordance with the provisions of
this Tariff.
This tariff embodies the instruction given by the court.
Appellant then complains that instruction SF was improper:
In order to find that a contract, either written or oral,
existed between the plaintiff 'and the defendant concerning
the use of the telephone numbers 673-4605, 673-4606,
673-4607 and 673-4608, you must find that the defendant
offered to let plaintiff use those numbers in consideration
of a monthly fee and that the plaintiff accepted that offer
and agreed to pay, in exchange therefore, a monthly fee
for the use of those telephone numbers. (R 319).
However,

again,

Appellant's own tariff,

Section 20 (B)

of

General Regulations, Eleventh Revised Sheet 1, reads:

1.

2.

Applications for establishment of telephone service
may be made to the Telephone Company orally or in
writing. These applications become contracts upon
approval or establishment of the service and shall
be subject at all times to the lawful rates and
regulations of the Telephone Company.
Requests from customers for additional service or
equipment may be made orally or in writing and,
upon approval or installation of the service,
become a part of the original contract, except that
each such additional item is subject to the
appropriate tariff rate and initial contract
period, if any.

Appellant complains there was
written

contract

for

such instructions."

the

"no evidence of an oral or

specific numbers upon which to base

This is manifestly untrue.

Appellant may

not have liked the evidence, but it exists nevertheless (Exh. 6,
Furthermore, J.

the tela lease).

Ralph Atkin and J.

MacArthur

Wright, testified they negotiated with Dennis Wood, Manager for
Mt.

Bell

in

St.

George,

673-4606 and 673-4607
a

rotary basis,

for

the

retention

of

the

numbers

(T.382, 563), and, to get four numbers on

accepted 673-4605 and 673-4608,

also Mr.
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Wood

agreed and gave the Respondent these four telephone numbers.
In Clayton

Home

Equipment

Company vs.

Florida

Telephone

Corporation 152 So 2d 203, the court refers to contracts thusly:
. . . that five months after said number was thus assigned
to plaintiffs the defendant arbitrarily and without just
cause withdrew said number and assigned a different number
to plaintiff'
telephone;
that as a
result of said
breach, they suffered damages to their business and
incurred expenses in changing the number as advertised.
The telephone number assigned to and accepted by one who
contracts for telephone services becomes a valuable
business asset in the hands of the subscriber, to which he
is entitled as a matter of contract, and he cannot be
deprived thereof without just cause depending on the
particular facts and circumstances in each case. Suffice
it to say that the act of the defendant in assigning to
plaintiffs a telephone number that had already been
assigned to another does not constitute just cause for
the alleged breach of contract or a proper basis on which
to avoid the damages, if any, suffered by plaintiffs.
In its contractual aspects the situation here is not
unlike that where there is a mistake in the printing of a
telephone directory,
with the
result
that
identical
telephone numbers are shown for different subscribers. In
Schwanke, Inc. v. Wisconsin Telephone Co., 199 Wis. 552,
227 N.W. 30, 68 A.L.R. 1320, the court said:
When a telephone company contracts to furnish telephone
service, it impliedly agrees to place the subscriber's name
and the telephone number in its directory, when that
directory is issued in due course of business.
Its failure
to do so constitutes a breach of contract, and it is
plainly
liable
upon
general
principles
for
damages
resulting from such breach. (Emphasis Added).
Appellant attempts to distinguish between a
services

and

a

contract

for

specific

contract for

telephone

numbers.

Respondent, contends there was, indeed, a contract for specific
telephone numbers, which was breached.

But also the record is

replete with breaches, by Appellant, of its contract to provide
reasonably adequate service.
In Muskegon Agency v. General Telephone Company 340 Mich.
472,

65 N.W.2d 748 the court quoted from the memorandum of the
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trial court:
In this case, we have an agreement based upon a valid
consideration of mutual promises.
There was a breach
of the agreement and of a duty by the defendant. . .
It was assumed, without question, a contract existed there,
just as one existed in the instant case.

Consequently it is a

mystery how the cited instructions can be found objectionable.
In Point II(B) of Appellant's Brief, complaint is made that
the Court erred in excluding portions of two instructions,
and

SB,

submitted by Appellant,

instructions

given

case,

the

while

spell

excluded

out

because

the

portions

the portions of

Respondent's
spell

out

theory
the

of

SA
the
the

Appellant's

theory.
Appellant's defense, however, was effectively submitted to
the

jury in other instructions which were given to the

The

excluded portions

in both

jury.

instructions dealt with Appel-

lant's claims that it is totally immunized by its tariffs filed
with the PSC.

Instructions 5G and SH,

however,

appropriately

spell out Appellant's immunity, if any, under the tariff:
SG - The defendant is a Public Utility under the laws of
the State of Utah and as such is subject to the tariffs
filed with, and approved by, the Public Service Commission.
Tariffs are rules and regulations with which the defendant
must comply.
One such Tariff provides that the defendant
is not liable for simple negligence in providing service,
however·, the defendant is not immune from gross negligence
or from willful and wanton conduct both of which are
synonymous terms under the law. (R. 320)
SH - A Tariff prepared by the defendant and submitted to
and approved by the Public $ervice Commission provides that
the subscriber has no property right in the telephone
number however, the defendant may not arbitrarily change a
subscribers telephone number, or exercise dominion over
said number causing damages to a subscriber without good
cause or a valid business reason; if it does so it is
liable for any damage to the subscriber. (R. 321)
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To have given these instructions together with the excluded
portions would have been an inordinate emphasis on Appellant's
claimed defenses.

One must look at all the instructions given

to determine whether the jury was properly instructed as Loew's,
Inc. v. Cinema Amusements, 210 F2d 86 pointed out:
But where the material issues in a case have been comprehensively and correctly covered in the general instructions, the court is not required to give requested instructions in terms to suit the desires of either party.
Since
the issues had been fairly and comprehensively covered in
the general instructions, the refusal of the requested instruction did not constitute error even though they were
correct statements of the law.
Even if it may have been proper to have included the
instruction,

the

test

as

stated

by

this

Court

in

Ivie

v.

Richardson, 9 Utah 2d 5, 336 P.2d 781 is that:
It is unnecessary and would serve no useful purpose for us
to decide whether any one of the errors above discussed,
considered
separately,
would
constitute
sufficient
prejudicial error to require a new trial.
The question is
whether the case was presented to the jury in such. a manner
that it is reasonable to believe there was a fair and
impartial analysis of the evidence and a just verdict.
The errors must be real and substantial and such as may
reasonably be supposed would affect the result.
In any event, the excluded portions do not accurately state
the law, infra, Point IV.
Subparagraph C of Appellant's Point II is only a variation
on its Points I and III.

If Appellant's position is untenable

as

as

to

those

two

points,

shown

by

Respondent's

Point

IV,

infra, then the instructions are clearly appropriate.
IV. THE TARIFFS AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ORDER DO
NOT PROVIDE APPELLANT A DEFENSE TO THE JURY AWARDS.
Assuming, arguendo, that the PSC did have jurisdiction over
the Yellow Pages advertising,

or had jurisdiction to make the
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order it entered, the Respondent should still prevail.
Essentially, Appellant's Points I and III in its brief deal
with the same issue, and are dealt with here together.

Respon-

dent submits the issues can be succinctly stated as follows:
A)

Is the Appellant immunized from any liability by the

Appellant's tariffs filed with the PSC?
B)
by

Is the Appellant immunized from liability to Respondent

the PSC' s

order to place an intercept on the Respondent's

numbers?
A. In dealing with the first of these two issues, Appellant
argues that because the PSC is granted "broad" powers to regulate public utilities, the entire field is pre-empted.
the

courts would necessarily be divested of

insofar

as

Public

Utilities

are

concerned,

any

If true,

jurisdiction

whether

regarding

negligence, willful misconduct, or breach of contract.
The fact is, the PSC does not have such broad· power or
jurisdiction,
paragraph
however,

2

and
of

acknowledged

its

Findings,

jurisdiction

over

it

did

"

civil

not

when

.the

court

liability

and

it

said

does

in

have,

damages .

(Exhibit 25 R. 129)
Furthermore, this court enunciated that principal when, in
granting

the

Appellant's

extraordinary

writ

on

February

17,

1981, it stated, "The tort action is to continue in the district
court."

(R.217)

Clearly, if the PSC's Order was dispositive of the issue of
Appellant's liability,

this court would not have ordered that

the tort action be permitted to proceed.
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The heart of Appellant's argument is that §20(E) (3) of its
own

tariff,

filed with

the

PSC,

limits

its

That

liability.

tariff reads:
The Telephone Company's liability arising from errors in or
omissions of directory listings shall be limited to and
satisfied by a refund not exceeding the amount of the
charges for such of the customer's service as is affected
during the period covered by the directory in which the
error or ornmission occurs.
However, the very next tariff, §20(E) (4) provides:
The Telephone Company, in accepting listings as prescribed
by applicants or customers, will not assume responsibility
for the result of the publication of such listings in its
directories, nor will the Telephone Company be a party to
controversies arising between customers or others as a
result of such publication.
(Emphasis Added).
The Appellant originally committed a simple mistake, not in
Respondent's listing--it was correct--but in the listing of the
Allen

firm,

when

it

published

Respondent's

telephone

number

after the name of Mr. Hughes in the yellow pages of Appellant's
directory.
at

The incorrect number appeared only at one place--and

no other place where

the

competing

firm's

name

appeared,

neither in the yellow nor in the white pages!
Upon complaint of the Allen firm, Appellant chose to become
a

party to a

controversy arising between customers over that

telephone number,

in direct violation of §20(E) (4)

supra.

Appellant elected to remain out of that controversy,

Had

let the

mistake stand until it could be remedied appropriately

(at a

subsequent printing of the directory--and incidently, Respondent
offered to refer all calls meant for the competing firm to them,
and evidence

at

the

trial

indicated that

calls was less than one per day,

the

number of

such

(Exhibit 7) , Appellant's lia-
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bility would have been limited by §20(E) (3) if applicable, or if
not, by its contractual limitation to the cost of the improper
listing.
However,

Appellant

legally unassailable

chose

not

to

follow

that

But

instead,

course of action,

chose to change the long-standing numbers of the

logical

and

willfully

R~spondent,

and

place a mechanical intercept on the old numbers of Respondent
and offer every caller the choice of either Respondent or the
competing firm.
Evidence

at

trial

among other things,
lines

for

obtain

malfunctioned

new
or

that

in

doing

so,

Respondent,

lost the use of all but one of its

incoming

the

showed

calls,
number

that

callers

before

automatically

the

were

often

unable

mechanical

terminated,

that

four
to

intercept

some

callers

were unable to even reach the intercept message and that long
distance

callers were

Respondent's office.
intercept
discloses

placed on
a

charged

for

two,

calls

before

reaching

Later when the TRO was removed and a live
the

plethora

of

Respondent's
abuses.

old
In

numbers,

addition,

the

record

Appellant's

actions directly violated §20(E) (4) supra.
Nevertheless, Appellant seeks immunity from what the
inevitably must have determined was,
breach of contract,

but willful

jury

not merely negligence or

conduct not protected by

its

tarift.
In addition to §20(E) (3), Appellant cites §20(N) (1):
The subscriber has no property right in the telephone
number nor any right to continuance of service through any
particular central off ice, and the Telephone Company may
change the telephone number or central office designation
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of a subscriber whenever it considers it desirable in the
conduct of its business.

(:.

tariffs

Similar

With

jurisdictions.
alleged right

to

ha.ve

been

respect

arbitrarily

interpreted

to

§20(N) (1),

take

in

numerous

concerning

one's numbers,

the

in Clayton,

supra the court at 204, astutely observed, where the defendant,
after

assigning

the

plaintiff

one

number,

withdrew

it

and

assigned a new one, that:
The telephone number assigned to and accepted by one who
contracts
for
telephone
services becomes
a
valuable
business asset in the hands of the subscriber, to which he
is entitled as a matter of contract,
and he cannot be
deprived thereof without just cause depending on the
particular facts and circumstances in each case.
Suffice
it to say that the act of the defendant in assigning to
plaintiffs a telephone number that had already been
assigned to another does not constitute just cause for the
alleged breach of contract or a proper basis on which to
avoid the damages,
if any,
suffered by plaintiffs."
(Emphasis Added).
In this case, suffice it to say that the act of Mt. Bell in
negligently
single

listing

attorney

constitute
tentional

in

"just

Respondent's

number

a

law

competing

cause"

infliction

innocent third party.

of

for

breach

severe

after

firm's
of

damages

the

listing

of a

does

not

the

in-

Respondent,

an

contract
on

name

or

The Clayton Court noted, in addition:

In its contractual aspects the situation here is not unlike
that where there is a mistake in the printing of a
telephone
directory,
with
the
result
that
identical
telephone numbers are shown for different subscribers.
In Shehies. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. 382 F.2d 627, a
case cited by the Appellant, the.telephone company relied upon a
tariff

nearly

identical

to

§

20(N) (1) ,the

Utah

tariff.

In

response to the contention that the tariff conferred an unqualified right upon the telephone company in respect to telephone
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numbers, the Tenth Circuit, on page 630, stated:
This contention was rejected by the trial court and we
think properly so.
The tariff provision negatives any
claim of a customer to a property right in a telephone
number but cannot be construed to authorize the telephone
company to exercise arbitrary dominion over the number so
as to cause harm and injury to another. (Emphasis Added).
Under a similar tariff in Price v. Southern Central Bell,
294 Ala.

144,

313 So.2d 184

(1975),

the court held that the

telephone company could not refuse to allow the continuance of
telephone service to a motor hotel under the same number to the
new owner, a foreclosure sale purchaser who refused to pay the
prior owner's past-due
telephone

company's

The

telephone bill.

actions

were

clearly

court stated the

arbitrary and would

cause injury to the new owner and then said, at page 188:
. . . if we followed the telephone company's interpretation
of (the ta.riff) ... changes in subscriber's numbers could be
made at the slightest whim of the company, regardless of
the consequences to subscribers .
. . . The trial court's finding obviously results from an
error of law, a construction of the applicable tariffs
which places an unlimited discretion in the telephone
company to deal with its telephone numbers as it pleases
and to change a new subscriber's number solely because a
new subscriber refuses to pay an old subscriber's past-due
bill.
(Emphasis Added).
Another

reason

inapplicable
conduct of

here

why

is

the

that

its business."

limitation

the
In

tariff

in

the

applies

the Muskegon

tariff

only

case,

is

"in

the

supra,

the

court considered Appellant's contentions in relation to a tariff
almost identical to the Utah tariff.
the

following

language

from

the

In ruling, the court used

trial

court's

opinion

(J?age

7 51) :

The change in the number and the kind of service extended
to the plaintiff by the defendant after June 1, 1950, was
not occasioned by the 'exigencies of the business' , but
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rather, by the negligence of the defendant's agents.
Therefore, again assuming the reasonableness of the rule,
the rule would be inapplicable to the instant case.
(Emphasis Added) .

c:.

Here, as there, the number change was not occasioned by the
"exigencies of the business" or the "conduct of its

busine~;s",

but by the negligence or error of Appellant.
Continuing the above quote at pages 751-52 it states:
Reasonable application of the rule does not give the
Company an unqualified right to change or cancel telephtme
numbers at any time.
The rule gives the Company the
privilege of changing numbers 'whenever exigencies of the
business so require. ' It would be an unreasonable interpretation and application of the rule to hold that the
Company could change numbers without liability for damages
whenever the Company is guilty of negligence, either gross
or ordinary.
Such an interpretation and application would
open the door to great abuse. A rule of this kind ought to
be strictly construed.
(Emphasis Added).
Concerning tariff §20(E) (3), the cases also hold that the
limitation of that tariff did not apply to
willful

or

wanton

in

nature.

For

conduct which is

example,

Southern

Bell

Telephone Company v. Invenchek, Inc., 204 S.E.2d 457 held:
Count 3 alleges that the interruptions of telephone
service,
delays,
and
disconnections
of
plaintiff's
telephone were the result of wilful misconduct on the part
of the defendant.
Here the tariff quoted above has no
application and constitutes no defense as against this
count, and the grant of the motion to strike was to this
extent accurate. (Emphasis Added).
Vails vs. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 504 F.
Supp. 740, after citing cases that have upheld
tariff limitations in mere negligence situations, the court
said:
The above cited cases held essentially that a
telephone company could limit its liability for negligent
omission or errors in directory advertising so long as it
does not seek immunity from gross negligence or wilful
misconduct. (Emphasis Added)\
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Pilot, supra, at page 362, after discussing at length
-the legality of tariffs limiting liability for such things as
service interruptions, stated:
This court is likewise convinced that the tariff on file
with the South Carolina Public Service Commission and the
Federal
Communication
Commission
effectively
limits
defendant's liability for service interruption in the
absence of its gross negligence or wilful/wanton conduct.
(Emphasis Added).
Concerning
or

willful

the

issue

of

what

conduct,

wanton

is

(often

interchangeably in the cases) ,

gross
the

negligence,

terms

the Pilot case,

are

supra,

or
used

on page

362, defined the terms as follows:
Gross negligence is the intentional conscious failure to do
a thing that is encumbent [sic] upon one to do, or the
doing of a thing intentionally that one ought not to do.
Certainly, whether the Appellant's conduct falls into that
category

or

not

is

a

jury question,

and

the

jury

evidently
Su ff ice

determined that Appellant's acts were indeed willful.

it to say the Appellant did, with full knowledge of the circumstances, elect to take the side of one customer,
whose

listing

customer,

the

Respondent's

was

"botched"

Respondent,
telephone

by

whose

numbers

Appellant,
listing was

from

it,

(its attorneys)
against

another

proper,

and

take

substitute

new

ones

and put an ineffective intercept mechanism on the old numbers.
The jury could have decided nothing else but that the acts of
the Appellant were the "doing of a thing intentionally that one
ought not to do."
B.

Pilot, supra.

Concerning the second point, whether the Appellant is

immunized from any liability to Respondent by the Order of the
PSC,

is

dependent on,

among other

things,

the

fact

that
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the

Appellant committed the act that made the order necessary.

As

c.
. _the trial judge observed at one point, if a Defendant causes one
to get cancer, that chemotherapy is ordered rather than surgery,
does not release Defendant's liability for the initial wrong.
The order was made because of the initial negligence of the
Appellant.
injecting
tariff,
Sokol

Furthermore, Appellant's subsequent wrongful act in
itself

§20
v.

apropos

(E) ( 4)

into
,

Public
to

this

a

situation

supra.

That

Utilities
case

as

is

is

forbidden

also

the

Commission,

the Appellant

418

by

its

own

that

the

is

not

There,

the

reason
P.2d

contends.

265

telephone company was informed by the San Francisco Police Chief
that he thought the Plaintiff's telephones were being used for
an

illegal purpose

(a bookie operation).

Pursuant to a pre-

existing order of the Public Utilities Commission, the Telephone
Company

thereupon

disconnected

the

telephone

lines

of

the

Plaintiff.
Upon being sued by the Plaintiff, the court held the telephone

company could not be

tariff

that

required,

held

liable

for

complying with a

upon notification by a

law enforcement

official that the lines were being used for a criminal purpose,
the telephone lines be disconnected.
There was

no

suggestion

that

the

order,

telephone company complied, was made necessary,

with which

the

by the act of

the telephone company whether negligent or not.
This court recognized that principal when it specifically
authorized the tort action for damages in the District Court to
proceed (R. 216).
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Though, after much research, Respondent has found few cases
\..::·

-dealing specifically with a

similar fact

situation,

analogies

can be drawn. In 17 Am. Jur. 2d 875, Contracts §419, it states:
Moreover, impossibility of performance which comes
about through a default of the contracting party under the
duty of performing is not excused where, through his
failure to carry out his obligations, a governmental
prohibition becomes applicable to and prevents performance
of the contract.
(Emphasis adaed)
In Williston on Contracts,

§1939,

stating generally that

one is protected if he was powerless to prevent or control the
governmental order, says:
if so, he will be discharged, provided the judicial
decree or proceeding was not generated by defendants own
act or fa u 1 t .
( Emphasis Added) .
Williston suggests the act bringing about the judicial decree or
order need

not

even be

I".egligent or wrongful,

just that

the

judicial order was brought about by the Defendant's own act!
In the instant situation,
dispute,

the

Appellant's

order
own

of

the

fault--its

though not precisely a contract

PSC
own

came
wrong

about

only

doing,

or

because
at

the

of

very

least, its own act.
In McAleer v. American Telephone Company, 416 F. Supp. 435,
the

above

rationale

that

one

can

not hide behind

a

judicial

decree when it was brought about by one's own act or wrong was
well illustrated when an employee and a union brought an action
under the Civil Rights Act alleging that the employee was denied
promotion

in

favor

of

a

less

qualified,

less

senior

female

employee who allegedly received the promotion solely because of
her sex.

Plaintiff alleged that he was denied the promotion to

which

was

he

entitled

under

the

provisions

of

a

collective
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The defendant

bargaining agreement.

justified its conduct by

pointing to a consent judgment containing an affirmative action
program

which

obligated

it

to

favor

women,

regardless

seniority, in order to eliminate past sex discrimination.

of
The

central legal issue was whether the consent judgment provided
defendant with
whether,

of

to

following

reliance

the

ordinarily one who acts pursuant to a

on

claims,

or

It was

was

conceded

plaintiff's

judgment, defendant was required to respond in damages.
defendant

its

defense

consent

that

spite

complete

the

true

in

a

consent

decree,

and

judicial order or other

lawful process has been protected from liability arising from
the act.

But the court held such protection did not exist where

the judicial order was

by the wrongful conduct of

nec~ssitated

the party sought to have been held liable.
on

which

the

defendant

relied

was

defendant's prior sex discrimination.

The consent decree

necessary

because

of

Under these circumstances

the decree provided no defense against the claims of a faultless
employee such as plaintiff.

The court held that plaintiff had a

cause of action for monetary damages under the Civil Rights Act.
The analogy in that case is remarkable in its similarity to
the instant case.
was made

Respondent was faultless and the PSC's Order

necessary by

the Appellant's

prior

act

or wrongful

conduct.
In

Savage vs.

Peter Kiewit

Sons'

Co.,

432

P.2d

519 the

issue of supervening impossibility was raised by Plaintiff when
it agreed it could not complete a contract as originally contemplated because of an injunction against it to prevent damage to
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a surrounding business.

The court reasoned, page 5 2 2 , and the

rationale is analogous to the instant case:
He (the plaintiff) was eventually able to complete his
promised sandblasting (in spite of the injunction), but to
do so he had to spend more money than he had planned on
SJ?ei;.ding. to ~rotect thi:d persons.
The alleged impossibility in this case arises out of increased expense in
complying with court orders.
In the

current case,

Appellant

is merely faced with the

same dilemma in complying with the PSC's Order, that is, paying
the increased cost, i.e., the damages for the injury it caused
to Respondent.

A Utah case, Castagna v. Church 552 P2d 1282,

reasoned along the same lines.
The Appellant here should surely have recognized that,

if

it made an error in its directory and then, more importantly,
took a course of action that would reasonably damage someone, it
would be subjected to extra costs or charges.
It

should

be

further

noted

that

to

adopt

Appellant's

theory,

its defense would have the illogical effect of circum-

venting

the

principal

adjudicate

tort

or

utilities.

Even

the

that

the

has

no

actions--even

damage
PSC

PSC

acknowledged

jurisdiction
against

it does

authority in the very order that is at issue here.

not

to

public

have

that

Yet, if that

order can be construed to immunize the Appellant from liability
for its willful acts, the PSC has adjudicated a tort or damage
action

as

deliberated

surely

as

over

the

if

it

had

evidence

held

and

a

found

full
the

blown

trial,

Appellant

not

liable!
The Muskegon case, supra, page 753, stated:
It is axiomatic that an administrative agency, vested with
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quasi-judicial as well as quasi-legislative powers, can act
upon complaints properly filed and accord a hearing to all
parties. The jurisdiction of the public service commission
under the statutory provisions is broad and comprehensive.
Yet that jurisdiction has generally been prospective in
operation.
However, it is not a proper tribunal to decide
a controversy after damage has been inflicted.
This is a
civil action to recover damages for breach of contract or
for negligence.
The commission has no jurisdiction to
award plaintiff damages or to reimburse plaintiff for its
losses.
Only a court, in accordance with due process, can
constitutionally award damages' in a civil action.

1;·.

The fallibility of Appellant's position
tected by
Product

the

Commission's

Order)

Research Associates

Company 16 Cal App.

v.

is

(that it is pro-

further

Pacific

demonstrated by

Telephone

3rd 651, 94 Cal. Rptr.

216.

&

Telegraph

In that case,

Plaintiff sued Defendant for loss of telephone service which it
contended

resulted

Japanese product.
tariff

limiting

in

the

loss

of

a

distributorship

of

a

The Defendant contended it was protected by a
its

liability

to

a

credit

for

interrupted

service not to exceed the amount of the total charges for the
service.
The Court of Appeals prefaced its opinion in reversing the
Superior

Court

that

had

granted

summary

judgment

for

the

telephone company, by saying:
We observe, initially, that the Commission does not have
exclusive jurisdiction over any and all matters having any
reference to the regulation and supervision of public
utilities
(quoting case). Thus under Public Utilitiy
Code,
Section 2106
[which is virtually identical to
§54-7-22, UCA] the courts of this state are expressly
granted jurisdiction to award both compensatory and (in a
proper case) exemplary damages against a public utility for
a loss, damage or injury resulting from any unlawful act or
omission to perform a required act.
The
i.e.,

by

PSC

should not be permitted to do by circumvention,

issuing

an

order,

what

it

cannot do

directly,
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i.e.

determine a damage issue.
V. SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE, THE BEST R.EASONABLY
OBTAINABLE, ESTABLISHED RESPONDENT'S LOSS BY THE MOST ACCURATE
BASIS POSSIBLE.
The

exact

damages
to

upon

Respondent

ascertain.

When

four

Appellant

are

lines

taken with virtually

are

impossible

inflicted

intercept fails to function,
with

problems,

difficult,

if

prospective

incorrect
not

failed or gave up.

who

notice,

when

a

telephone
mechanical

when a live intercept is plagued
responses

impossible,

clients

nc;>

by

for

attempted

and

rudeness,

Respondent
to

contact

to

is

it

find

those

Respondent

but

Several established clients testified about

the various difficulties they encountered in telephoning Respondent

(T. 122, 278,

291,

297), including some who took business

elsewhere or took care of their problem personally because of
the

telephone problems

(T.

292).

Accounting records

and ex-

penses made necessary by the change in numbers, charts depicting
the decline in expected revenue, and a chart showing the drastic
reduction

in

telephone

calls

received were all presented and

explained in detail by testimony to the jury (Exh.
29,

30,

31,

showed,

for

the

28,

32

in volume

33).

fourth

anticipated income,
growth

&

For example,

quarter

of

1980,

firm was

27,

the charts on income
a

based on the prior year's

Respondent

22, 23,

$11,105

drop

in

income and the

experiencing

(Exh.

The data for 1981 showed a nearly normal first quarter.

27).
This

was mainly before the restraining order was lifted and the live
intercept installed.

After the intercept, Respondent suffered a

severe drop in the second and third quarters before stabilizing
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somewhat in the fourth quarter, when a correct telephone book
came out.

The total decline in expected revenues for the year

1981 was $29,532.
$ 4 0 , 6 3 7 ( Exh .

Dr.

Added to the $11,105, the total loss would be

2 7) •

Simmons,

an

expert

disruption would have a

witness,

testified

that

very serious and adverse

such

a

impact upon

callers, causing many of them to go elsewhere (T. 138-158).

Mr.

Hughes, Appellant's own witness, testified that a correct yellow
page

listing was

additional

worth

revenues

approximately

for his

firm,

a

Respondent's in St. George (T. 712).

$3, 000. 00
firm of

per

month in

similar size to

A year at that rate would

support a judgment of $36,000.
The

jury verdict of $25, 000. 00 appears to be well within

!II

the

parameters

of

the

evidence

presented

and

should

not

be

modified on appeal simply because the actual damages sustained
cannot be proved with mathematical precision.

Appellant's own

witness said the loss of one good case could cause $100,000 in
damages (T. 711).
In Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Reeves
1st Dist)

578 SW2d 795, a

(1979, Tex Civ App

judgment of $10, 000 in lost profits

for an attorney where the telephone company failed to intercept
calls to an old number and refer callers to the new number was
upheld

al though

ascertainment.
Bell Tel. Co.

the

exact

Accord,

B

amount
&

of

damage was

W _Rustproofing,

incapable of

Inc.

v.

Michigan

(1979) 88 Mich App 242, 276 NW2d 572.

In Muskegon, Agency, Inc. v. General Telephone Company 350
Mich.

41,

85

N. W. 2d

1 70,

the

Michigan

Supreme

Court,
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having

previously remanded the case for trial
tariffs

(Muskegon, supra) saying

like those Appellant relies on here were no defense,

affirmed an award of $16, 000 damages for lost business to the
Plaintiff
rotary

subscriber,

service

to

an

insurance

accomodate

given new numbers with

the

its

agency.

increased

change-over

issuance of ·the next directory.

to

Plaintiff
business

sought
and was

coincide with

the

Immediately after the change

Plaintiff learned that the new number assigned was already in
use by a local bank.

The phone company gave Plaintiff its old

number back, meaning Plaintiff was disconnected from its listed
number

from

June

Respondent was.
refer

callers

6,
The

1950
phone

seeking

to

June

1,

1951,

company arranged

Plaintiff

to

the

a

year,

for

old

the

just as
bank

number.

to

This

solution, much like the live intercept in this case, proved to
be inadequate.

Plaintiff presented evidence at trial estimating

the loss of new business and renewal business normally expected
on new clients.

The

court conceded the proof of damages was

subject to doubt, but refused to find the damages speculative or
conjectural.
a

The Court quoted Allison v. Chandler 11 Mich. 542,

well-reasoned

and

extensively

quoted

case,

wherein

it

is

stated:
Since, from the nature of the case, the damages cannot be
estimated with certainty, and there is a risk of giving by
one course of trial less, and by the other more than a fair
compensation--to say nothing of justice--does not sound
policy require that the r.;i.sk should be thrown upon the
wrong doer instead of the injured party?
. But shall
the injured party in an action of tort, which may happen to
furnish no element of certainty, be allowed to recover no
damages (or merely nominal) , because he can not show the
exact amount with certainty, though he is ready to show, to
the satisfaction of the jury, that he has suffered large
damages by the injury? Certainty, it is true, would thus
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be attained;

but it would be the certainty of injustice.

The law does not require impossibilities; and can not
therefore require a higher degree of certainty than the
nature of the case admits.
. Juries are allowed to act
upon probable and inferential, as well as direct and
positive proof. And when, from the nature of the case, the
amount of the damages can not be estimated with certainty,
or only a part of them can be so estimated, we can see no
objection to placing before the jury all the facts and
circumstances of the case, having any tendency to show
damages, or their probable amount; so as to enable them to
make the most intelligible and probable estimate which the
nature of the case will permit. (Emphasis added)
This

last

part

was

quoted

with

approval

in

Gould

v.

Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, 6 Utah 2d 187,
309 P.2d

802

(1957),

where the Plaintiff attorney was negli-

gently omitted from the classified section or "yellow pages" and
brought action for loss of past and future profits.

The Utah

Court therein distinguished the cases relied upon by Appellants.
After setting forth the facts of those cases, this Court said:
It will be noted that both cases are readily distinguishable from the instant case in that in both cases Plaintiff
introduced no evidence to show any causal relation between
loss of profits and th~ error in the directory, whereas in
the instant case Plaintiff has shown that he lost some
referral matters.
Where the plaintiff has shown actual
loss of business during the period as a result of defendant's breach of contract, he will not be denied recovery
because the exact amount of damage cannot be readily
ascertained.
To this effect is the rule laid down by this
court that where the fact of substantial damage is shown,
the court or jury cannot award nominal damages only on the
ground that the amount of substantial damage has not been
shown with reasonable certainty.
The rule against recovery of uncertain damages is
generally directed against uncertainty with respect to
cause rather than to measure or extent, so that a party who
has broken his contract will not ordinarily be permitted to
escape liability because of uncertainty in amount of damage
resulting, and the fact that the full extent of damages for
breach of contract roust be a matter of speculation is not a
ground for refusing all damages.
Respondents produced evidence of much lost business,
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such

as

the

testimony

of

Richard

Hunter,

who,

due

to

his

invalid

condition and inability to reach Mr. Miles by phone, performed
the legal work himself (T. 287-294).
The Gould case then quoted from Sommerville v. Chesapeake &
P. Telephone Co.

(49 App D.C. 3), 258 F. 147 as follows:

'* * * But * * * it does not seem reasonable that in these
days, when a telephone is an indispensable adjunct to every
line of business, the inevitable inconvenience, annoyance,
and loss of time caused to a subscriber by the wrongful
action of the company in cutting off his service without
notice should not be regarded as a proper subject for
compensatory damages.
To prove that one lost a certain
number of dollars by reason of the company's action might
be very difficult, and yet, we think, all reasonable men
would say that he was injured thereby. * * *" (emphasis
original)
In Registered Physical Therapists, Inc. vs. Jepson 584 P.2d
857 (1978), this Court said:
. where damages are attributable to the wrong of the
defendant and are only uncertain as to amount, they will
not
be
denied
even
though
they
are
difficult
of
ascertainment.
Appellant argue that Respondent's proof regarding loss of
income, that is, of gross receipts, is fatally defective because
proof of net profits lost is required.
as May 11, 1981,

Appellant knew as early

several months prior to trial, that the proof

would be restricted to gross income lost and Appellant should be
estopped to raise this point for the first time on appeal.
At the Pre-Trial hearing held May 11, 1981 the subject of
Respondent's
been

obtained

federal
by

income

Appellant

tax returns,
through

which had previously

discovery,

was

discussed.

most of the tax deductions reported on the federal tax return
were

not

deductions

affected
claimed

by

Appellant's

for

building

actions.
and

For

equipment

example,

depreciation,
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the

secretarial

insurance,

utilities,

salaries,

payroll

taxes,

repairs to building and equipment, rent, dues and licenses, and
interest paid on building and equipment

loans were fixed and

constant expenses, regardless of the volume of business.

Only

if business greatly increased, requiring expansion, or greatly
decreased, requiring closure of the business, would these fixed
expenses vary appreciably.
in

proportion

to

the

Very few expenses of a law firm vary

volume

of

Only

business.

the

gross

receipts of Respondent was substantially affected by Appellant's
wrongful actions.
The Court thereupon ordered, at the May 11, 1981 Pre-Trial,
and

with

the

actual

stipulation

(Pre-Trial Conference P. 27),

net

profits

rather

evidence of damages,

Appellant's

counsel

that the Respondent's tax returns

could not be presented to the jury.
only

of

than gross

but Appellant,

Appellant now contends that
receipts
having

so

can be credible
stipulated has

waived the right to complain on this issue.
In Security Development Company v. Fedco,

Inc.

23 Utah 2d

306, 462 P.2d 700

(1969) this court recognized that evidence of

decline

receipts

in

gross

was

sufficient

to

support

a

jury

verdict when it stated:
There was testimony of experts to the effect that net
profits are directly related to gross profits which in turn
are directly related to gross sales. The jury, therefore,
had evidence of a proper basis from which it could have
determined that plaintiff's.business was adversely affected
by the deprivation of floor space.
Damages are not to be
denied simply because they cannot be ascertained with
exactness.
If a reasonable basis of calculation is
afforded, it is sufficient al though the result is only
approximate.
Since gross sales declined rather
regularly with reduction in floor space, and since sales
were made to a membership of clients which was increasing
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as time went on, the jury could find that the reduction in
the amount of sales was directly related to the reduction
in floor space given to the plaintiff.
In making its decision, the Utah Court quoted Lavender v.
Kurn 3 2 7 U . S . 6 4 5 , 6 5 3 , 6 6 S . Ct . 7 4 0 , 7 4 4 , 9 0 L . Ed . 916

( 19 4 5)

as follows:
It is no answer to say that the jury's verdict involved
speculation and conjecture.
Whenever facts are in dispute
or the evidence is such that fair minded men may draw
different inferences, a measure of speculation and conjecture is required on th~ part of those whose duty it is to
settle the dispute by choosing what seems to them to be the
most reasonable inference.
. Where, as here, there is
an evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict, the jury is
free to discard or disbelieve whatever facts are inconsistent with its conclusion.
And the appellate court's
function is exhausted when that evidentiary basis becomes
apparent, it being immaterial that the court might draw a
contrary inference or feel that another conclusion is more
reasonable.
Respondent produced at trial the best evidence reasonably
obtainable.
lant' s

Most expense items were unaffected by the Appel-

action,

expenses

from

materially

being
gross

assist

the

"fixed

expenses".

income

to

obtain

jury

and

could

Subtraction
net
lead

income
to

of

these

would

not

confusion

over

expenses not relevant to the case.
To show loss of income the claimant must establish his loss
"by the most accurate basis possible under the circumstances.
He

must

produce

the

best

evidence

reasonably

Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
Cir. 1953)
that

the

204 F. 2d 381.
telephone

obtainable."

Hinchcliffe

(10th

In this case the tenth circuit noted

company,

as

here,

did

not

challenge

sufficiency of the evidence at trial or after the verdict.

the
The

Court then said:
Hinchcliffe

introduced

other

evidence

in

support
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of

his

claim of loss of profits, which we think measured up to the
requirement that the plaintiff must produce the best
evidence reasonably available.
The
which

Court

included

then

made

evidence

reference
of

gross

to

the

receipts

"other evidence,"
and

difficulty

in

getting through to his office, the same type of evidence abundantly produced by Respondent in this case.
Mountain States Telephone
F. 2d

166,

&

Telegraph Co.

relied upon by Appellant,

Unlike Garcia v.

(10th Cir. 1963)

Respondent

in

this

315
case

showed that the decrease in gross income was directly related to
the wrongful actions of Appellant by introducing evidence of a
sharp decline in incoming calls,

several clients who testified

they had difficulty and would have taken their business elsewhere had they been calling for the first time, and the expert
testimony of Dr.

Simmons showing that new clients, calling on

the recommendation of a friend or from the yellow pages, would
quickly

call

another

lawyer

upon

experiencing

the difficulty

frequently encountered by callers attempting to reach Respondent.
Winsness,

supra,

states the rule that should govern this

case:
Where there is strong evidence of the fact of damage, a
defendant should not escape liability because the amount of
damage ~annot be proved with precision.
In Prince v. Peterson (Utah, 1975) 538 P.2d 1325 this court
stated:
We frequently declare our commitment to the jury system,
under which it is the prerogative of lay citizens to
determine questions of fact, both as to liability and the
fixing of damages; and in cases of this character their
varied experiences and their closeness to the reality of
everyday affairs qualify them to fix damages as well as or
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perhaps better than judges. The court should give the jury
system more than lip service, by honoring the jury's prerogatives; and by declining to interfere therewith unless the
determinations made are entirely without foundation in
evidence, or are so fragmentary and unsubstantial that no
reasonable minds acting fairly on the evidence could have
so concluded.
In addition to what has been said concerning
the fact that the jury seems to have sensed what had
occurred and to have done justice concerning it, the trial
court also indicated his approval by refusing to interfere
with the verdict or to grant a, new trial.
The jury's verdict, on the evidence presented, could have
been

more

within

than

the

$40,000.00.

The

evidence presented and

$25,000.00

awarded

is

well

should not be disturbed on

appeal.
VI. PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE APPROPRIATE
In

disputing

three subheadings.

the

punitive

damage

award,

Appellant

lists

The first point is that Appellants acts were

not wrongful.
UCA

54-7-22

sets

the

paramaters

for

both

an

award

of

damages and for an award of exemplary or punitive damages with
respect to Public Utilities:
54-7-22.
DELICT OF UTILITIES--CIVIL LIABILITY--(!)
In
case any public utility shall do or cause or permit to Ee
done any act, matter or thing prohibited, forbidden or
declared to be unlawful, or shall omit to do any act,
matter or thing required to be done, either by the
Constitution or any law of this state or by any order or
decision of the commission, such public utility shall be
liable to the persons ~ffected thereby for all loss,
damages or injury caused thereby or resulting therefrom,
and if the court shall find that the act or omission was
willful, the court shall, in addition to the actual
damages, award exemplary damages. An action to recover for
such loss, damage or injury may be brought in any court of
competent jurisdiction by any person.
(Emphasis added)
To mention only the obvious, Appellant violated its tariff,
§20, (E) (4),

supra,

by

interjecting

itself

into

a

controversy

between customers.
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The Appellant failed to comply with UCA 54-3-1 which among
other things requires of a Public Utility that it:
. . . shall furnish, provide and maintain such service
instrumentalities, equipment and facilities as will promote
the safety, health, comfort and convenience of its patrons,
employees and the public, and as will be in all respects
adequate, efficient, just and reasonable. (Emphasis added)
"Shall" is mandatory, not disc.retionary.
Section UCA 54-3-8 provides in part:
No public utility shall, as to rates, charges, service,
facilities or in any other respect, make or grant any
preference or advantage to any person, or subject any
~p_e_r_s_o_n~-t~o~_a_n~y~Ap_r_e~J~·u~d_i_c_e~_o_r~_d_1_·s~a_d_v_a_n_t_a--"'-g_e.
(Emphasis
added)
Appellant violated that mandatory directive when it elected
to grant a preference to the Allen firm, its attorney, and take
Respondent's

especially

contracted

for

numbers

from

it.

The

record, is replete with other abuses by Appellant.
Appellant's second point,
and

malicious,

is

that its acts were not willful

contradicted

by

UCA

requires "willful" and not "malicious".
conduct

or

gross

negligence

tional,"

"conscious,"

act)

an

as

is

54-7-22

which

only

In any event, willful

generally

defined

as

"inten-

"indifference," or "conscious of it

invasion of

the

Plaintiff's

rights"

etc.,

(the

Pilot,

..

supra.
Appellant's

third

point

is

that

Respondent

suffered

no

actual damage, which is a rather remarkeable conclusion in view
of the jury verdict for $25,000 .compensatory damages based upon
the evidence and the law heretofore discussed.
In discussing punitive damages,
heretofore

need

not

be

repeated

the facts as spelled out

but

should

be

remembered.
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Against the backdrop of those facts,

the Respondent cites the

following cases:
The

Appellant

referred

to

Waters

vs.

Pacific

Telephone

Company 528 P.2d 1161 in support of the proposition that it is
protected by
couch

its

the

tariff.

decision

"ordinary negligence"

on

However,
the

that case was

predicate

involved.

that

careful

there

was

Respondent contends,

to

only

and the

jury agreed, the instant case goes beyond ordinary negligence.
The dissent in the Waters case,
should

have

been

denied

ordinary negligence,

the

makes

arguing that the utility

tariff

protection

even

some valid observations

for

that

the
cer-

tainly do apply to conduct beyond ordinary negligence, even if
they

don't

apply

to

simple

negligence.

In

referring

to

a

California statute, which is virtually identical to UCA 54-3-1,
supra, Justice Mask noted:
. section 451 which in relevant part, asserts:
'Every
public utility shall furnish and maintain such adequate,
efficient, just, and reasonable service, instrumentalities,
equipment, and f acili t-ies as are necessary to promote the
safety, heal th, comfort, and convenience of -its patrons,
employees, and the public.'
Section 451 is a statutory command that the telephone
company 'shall furnish 'adequate' service to its patrons.
Failure to do so violates the statute and is unlawful.
It
expresses the public policy of this state that public
utilities
without
the
customary
competitive
business
incentives, shall be held to a high standard of performance
in the ~ervice they have undertaken to render.
It is, important to note that monopolies, without the need
to compete for business, require $Orne incentive to encourage them
to deliver a reasonable standard of service.
The
support

Appellant
its

cited

argument

Elkington vs.

that

willful

Faust

and

618

P.2d

malicious

acts
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37,

to
are

necessary to

support punitive damages,

ignoring,

the

impact of

The Elkington case actually sustained an award of

UCA 54-7-22.

$30,000 punitive damages on top of compensatory damages of only
$12,000, noting, page 41, that the
apart

from

the

penalty

provisions

certain violations of statutory

"ratio is not too far

.
in

some

civil

proh~bitions . . .

matters

for

",and added:

. . . They (punitive damages) are allowed as a punishment to
the offender, and as a warning to him, and to others, not to
engage in similar vexatious actions.
• When such facts
are found to exist, the amount of such award is left to the
sound judgment of the jury as related to the circumstances
of the individual case.
In

the

instant

the

case,

compensatory

damages

were

$25,000 and the exemplary only $30,000, much less than the ratio
of almost 3 to 1 allowed in the Elkington case.
This

court,

Feedya.rds,

Inc.,

discussed

in

punitives from

in

First

(case No.

detail

Security
17269

punitive

$100,000 to

&

Bank

17270

damages,

Of

Utah

filed July
and

though

JBJ

vs.
20,

1982)

reducing

$50,000 on approximately $34,000 in

compensatory damages, the court provided guidelines for awarding
punitive damages:
In determining the amount of such damages, the fact finder
should consider the following factors: (1) the nature of the
alleged misconduct of the defendant, ( 2) the extent of the
effect of the misconduct on the lives of the plaintiff and
others, ( 3) the probability of future recurrence of such
misconduct, ( 4) the relationship between the parties, ( 5)
the re la ti ve weal th of the defendant, ( 6) the facts and
circumstances surrounding the misconduct, (7) and the amount
of actual damages awarded.
The Respondent believes, from the record and from the award,
the

jury

followed

those

guidelines

and

that

the

award

is

reasonable.
This court in Terry vs.

Zions Co-Op Mercantile Institution
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605 P.2d 314, restored punitive damages to the amount awarded by
the jury, $15,000.00, after the trial court had remitted them to
$2,000.00.

The court observed, page 328:

Due to the purposes underlying the award of punitive damages
many factors contribute in determining their appropriate
measure.
While the amount of compensatory damages awarded
is one such factor, it is not the exclusive one.
The jury
in its original decision or the court in its review of that
decision must also consider the particular nature of the
defendant's acts,
the probability of those acts being
repeated in the future, and the relative weal th of the
particular defendant.
In the instant case, the jury made a finding and an award of
punitive damages very close to the compensatory award.

Evidence

showed the Appellant to have a net worth of $2,873,600,000,
26 page 7) .
his

own,

(Exh.

The trial judge was neither asked, nor did he, on

remit

any

amount

contrary, he commended the

of

j~ry

the

punitive

award.

On

the

for a job well done (T. 784).

Of significance is the comment made by Mr.

Justice Hall in

the concurring and dissenting opinion in the Terry case supra:
The trial judge was in a unique position which afforded him
the opportunity to observe the matter first hand and to
sense the events and personalities involved and thus to
guard against an award of punitive damages reflective of
passion or animus.
His determination that the damages in
question must bear some reasonable relationship to the
injury and actual damages suffered is in accord with ·the
general rule of law on the subject.
Though,

in that instance, the trial judge had attempted to

remit a portion of the punitive damages,
above

quotation

is

Both

appropriate.

the philosophy of the

the

jury

and

the

trial

judge are in a unique position to observe the matter first hand.
And

when,

punitive
pensatory,

as

here,

damages
those

their

bear

a

judgments
reasonable

collective

apparently
relationship

judgments--the

agree
to

and
the

com-

jury' s--and

the
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the

judge's should stand.
In Clayton vs.
No.

17013,

filed

Crossroads

Sept.

17,

Equipment Company/ et al, -- (Case

1982)

this

court

found

a wrongful

attachment and pointed out:
It is well established in the jurisprudence of this state
that punitive damages may be awarded when the proof supports
a finding that the defendant's conduct was wilful or
malicious. (emphasis added)
In explaining that the court further, stated:
. such gross neglect of duty as to evince a reckless
indifference of the rights of others on the part of the
wrongdoer, and an entire want of care so as to raise the
presumption that the person at fault is conscious of the
consequences of his carelessness.
The attitude of agents of the Appellant, and the cavalier
manner in which the Appellant imposed the damage which the jury
found to have been inflicted, represented "reckless indifference
of the rights of others."

Certainly Appellant was conscious of

the consequences of its carelessness.
Another case decided by this court is Nash vs. Craigco, Inc.
(1978)
owed

585
to

P.2d

his

corporation.

775.

The defendant breached a

co-stockholder

in

the

issuance

of

f idiciary duty
stock

in

the

The Court observed, page 776, that:

We have reviewed the evidence and find that reasonable minds
could differ in deciding whether defendant acted wilfully
and maliciously in issuing the 14,700 shares of stock, and
whether he did so with the intent to injure the plaintiff . .
. . As to punitive damages in this case, it appears that the
question was one for the jury to decide.
Whether willful, as used in UCA 54-7-22, means malice-in-se,
or only malice-in-law,

Sommers vs.

Telegraph Company 519 P. 2d 874,

Mountain States Telephone

&

(1974), held:

The trial court found Mountain Bell breached its agreement
with the plaintiff to provide intercept service until new
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directories had been issued, and that this breach was the
result of a deliberate business decision on the part of the
company.
The trial court further found that although discontinuance of the intercept service was "wilful" in the sense that
it was deliberately and knowingly done, it was not a wilful
act in the sense that it was done with malice or with a
primary intent to injure the plaintiff . . . .
Plaintiff has appealed the judgment insofar as it
determined the existence of a limitation on liability and
limited damages to the sum of $65.00.
The sole question presented by this appeal is whether the
exculpatory clause within the tariff precludes lfability for
"willful and deliberate" acts unless a customer can show
malice or intent to injure him. (Emphasis added)
Though
limitation,

this

case

was

dealing

primarily

with

the

tariff

its definition of willful is applicable as well to

the issue of punitive damages for willful conduct as provided in
UCA 54-7-22.

The court found:

if we accept Mountain Bell's contention that malice
or intent to injure is necessary, (the result) would be that
it would escape liability for acts done under authorization
of other tariffs even if done with malicious intent to
injure the other contracting parties.
We do not believe
this to be the intent of the tariff provision.
Webster's New World Dictionary defines wilful as "done
deliberately or intentionally".
Deliberate is defined as
"carefully thought out or formed; premeditated; done on
purpose".
Nowhere in these definitions do we find an
implication of malice. The words employed in a contract and
the purpose of the writing must be ascertained from their
common sense meaning as a whole . . . .
We find that even if a requirement of malice can be read
into the tariff, the plaintiff is still entitled to recover.
Malice has been defined by our Supreme Court as the
"intentional
doing
of
a
wrongful
act without
legal
justification or excuse, or .
. the wilful violation of a
known right .
. Malice in the sense of ill will or spite
not being essential.'
Respondent submits, then, that not only were the punitive
damages appropriate, but the amount was also proper.
VII RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
Appellant, in its Point IV (A), claim Respondent's loss was
an impermissible claim for attorney's fees.

Appellant's theory
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is

that

the

Respondent

revenue

firm

were

dropped

off

spending

time

because
on

the

this

attorneys
The

case.

in
jury

Evidence at trial

obviously didn't accept Appellant's theory.

showed that the attorneys had to make up time by working weekends
and evenings (T. 542-43).
More importantly, the trial court erred when it refused to
give Respondent's proposed Instructions No.
attorney's

fees

for

breach

of

contract,

2 and 8 relating to
or

as

an

element of

damages, or for successfully resisting Appellant's motion to this
Court for a Writ Of Prohibition

(R.

171, 193-95).

An exception

was taken (T.779-80).
Exh. 6, the tela lease contract, paragraph 23, provides for
attorney's fees upon default.
allow attorney's

fees

In addition, 78-27-56, UCA, would

if Appellant did not act in good faith.

Another basis for attorney's fees is as " . . . a legitimate item
of damage resulting from a wrongful act."
(Utah, 1979) 592 P.2d 583).
47

uses

(Capson v.

Brisbois

A final basis for attorneys fees is

§206, which provides:

In case any common carrier shall do, or cause or permit to
be done, any act, matter, or thing in this Act prohibited or
declared to be unlawful, or shall omit to do ·any act,
matter, or thing in this Act required to be done, such
common carrier shall be liable to the person or persons
injured thereby for the full amount of damages sustained in
consequence of any such violation of the provisions of this
Act, together with a reasonable counsel or attorney's feee,
to be fixed by the court in every case of recovery, which
attorney's fee shall be taxed and collected as part of the
costs in the case. (Emphasis.added)
CONCLUSION
The

unanimous

jury verdict

should be

affirmed

as

to

the

award of compensatory and punitive damages and remanded to the
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v

t. George, Utah 84770
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Respondents

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed two true and
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT in Case No.
18232, postage prepaid, this

./~~y

of November, 1982, to

David S. Dolowitz, Attorney for Appellant, at 185 South State
Street, P. O. Box 11898, Salt L~~,~' Utah )74147._,,1

•
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\ .:Hans Q. Chamberlain
\. .,
I
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